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1. Introduction to the Development Policy Centre 
The Development Policy Centre is Australia’s leading research centre on aid 
effectiveness. Established in September 2010, the Centre’s blog (http://devpolicy.org), 
publications and events (http://devpolicy.anu.edu.au) provide a unique resource for 
Australia and the wider region. Further detail on the Centre’s activities can be found in 
our 2011 annual report. 
This submission is written by Professor Stephen Howes, Director of the Development 
Policy Centre and Mr Jonathan Pryke a researcher at the Centre. Professor Howes has 
twenty-five years of experience working in and on aid and development in the Asia-
Pacific region. Formerly Lead Economist for India with the World Bank and Chief 
Economist with AusAID, he was a lead author of the Core Group Report on Aid 
Effectiveness (2006), the review of Australian aid to PNG (2010) and the Independent 
Review of Aid Effectiveness (2012). He currently serves on the Board of CARE Australia. 
Jonathan Pryke graduated from the ANU in 2011 with a Masters in Public Policy and 
Masters in Diplomacy. Ms Alicia Mollaun also contributed to this submission via the 
provision of a literature survey. Ms Mollaun is a PhD student at the Crawford School 
working on American aid to Pakistan. She has worked for the Australian Government 
with PM&C and DFAT, and is currently on leave from DFAT. 
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2. Comments on the nature and the scope of the Review and this submission 
We welcome this review by the Senate Committee. Reviews of Australian aid by the 
Australian Parliament are few and far between. To our knowledge, the last 
Parliamentary Review of Australian aid was in 2006 in relation to aid to the Pacific.  
Given the rapidly expanding nature of the Australian aid program, we believe there 
should be more reviews of Australian aid. Indeed, several commentators have 
recommended a dedicated Parliamentary Committee on aid. John Eyers, former Chief 
Adviser (International) in the Australian Treasury from 2004 to 2006 has made the 
recommendation in a Devpolicy blog post here. The Independent Review of Aid 
Effectiveness made the same recommendation, namely that “parliamentary engagement 
could be further strengthened through a parliamentary committee or sub–committee 
focused on aid and development” (pg. 32). It can be noted that the UK Parliament has an 
“International Development Committee”. 
Recommendation 1 
That given the usefulness of Parliamentary reviews of aid, their infrequency, and 
the rapid expansion of the aid program, Parliament should establish some sort of 
Aid Committee. 
Evaluating aid effectiveness is never an easy exercise. Often it is difficult to isolate the 
impact of aid. Information is scarce, and feedback difficult to obtain. While measures can 
be taken to mitigate them, these problems are very much in the nature of aid given the 
fundamental geographical disconnect which underlies all aid: the fact that aid funds are 
raised in one country and disbursed in another. 
Evaluating aid to Afghanistan raises special challenges. It is very difficult to visit 
Afghanistan. There is a huge shortage of impartial information.  
Given this situation, our own submission should be regarded as neither definitive nor 
comprehensive. One of us (Prof. Howes) visited Afghanistan (Kabul and Uruzgan) in 
2010 as part of the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness. We have also talked to 
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others involved in the delivery of aid to Afghanistan, and read the literature around aid 
to Afghanistan. Given the severe data limitations, and the difficulty of undertaking an 
aid evaluation, our submission is able to touch on only a few of the issues around aid to 
Afghanistan, and not necessarily the most important ones.  In particular, we say nothing 
about the critical issue of humanitarian space, or on the proper balance between 
channelling funds through government and through NGOs, or on the question of the 
appropriateness of funding levels. Nevertheless, we hope that our submission will help 
the Committee in the important and difficult task which it has been set. 
The terms of reference of the Review are heavily focused on the evaluation of Australia’s 
aid. This is commendable. Points (a) and (b) of the terms of reference specifically call for 
an evaluation of Australian aid to Afghanistan. Point (a) requires an evaluation of 
Australia’s bilateral aid. Point (b) requires an evaluation of multilateral aid, aid 
delivered by other government departments, and of interactions between different 
types of aid. 
Three preliminary points in regard to these two terms of reference need to be made. 
First, evaluations of effectiveness can only be done in relation to pre-agreed objectives. 
If the objectives are not established and agreed on, an assessment of effectiveness is 
impossible. As we discuss later in this submission, it is clear that in Afghanistan the 
objectives of aid are strategic as well as developmental. Both criteria need to be used 
when assessing effectiveness. 
Recommendation 2 
That to conduct the aid evaluation required in its terms of reference, the 
Committee needs to first establish what the goals are for the Australian aid 
program in Afghanistan. In our view, these goals should be defined in both strategic 
and developmental terms.  
Second, while the task of the Committee is to undertake an evaluation of Australian aid, 
the hard reality is that we cannot be confident of the success (or otherwise) of 
Australia’s aid for several years to come and perhaps not for decades. Say that, after 
international troops are drawn down, the Kabul Government collapses and the Taliban 
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regains power. Whatever strategic and developmental goals the aid program has made 
to date would suffer huge reversals. For this reason, although the focus of the enquiry is 
on the Transition Decade (the 10-years up to 2014, when troops will be drawn down), 
the evaluation required by the enquiry needs to be based on some projections or 
scenario analysis.  
We are not strategic experts, but on the basis of consultations, our working assumption 
is that after 2014 enough US troops stay to shore up the Karzai government (or at least 
a non-Taliban government), but that the control of that government shrinks even 
further and that provinces like Uruzgan become no-go territories for the Afghan 
government and for international aid personnel, except those which are able to operate 
in a humanitarian mode. 
Recommendation 3 
That to conduct the aid evaluation required in its terms of reference, the 
Committee formulate explicit scenarios for the future of Afghanistan without which 
it will not be possible to evaluate the effectiveness of aid expenditures to date. 
Third, when considering bilateral aid to Afghanistan, both AusAID and aid from other 
government departments should be considered. This would be consistent with the 
standard definition of bilateral aid. Alternatively, the first point in the terms of reference 
could be taken to be restricted to aid from AusAID.  
3. Summary of global aid to Afghanistan  
It is impossible to evaluate Australian aid without putting it in the broader context of 
total global aid to Afghanistan. Aid to Afghanistan has exploded over the course of the 
last decade, as Figure 1 below shows. Aid to Afghanistan prior to 2000 never exceeded 
$US 1 billion, and was often well below that figure. In 2002 and 2003 Afghanistan 
received about $US 2 billion of aid annually. In 2004, 2005 and 2006, Afghanistan 
received about $US 3 billion of aid. In 2007 and 2008, this increased to $US 5 billion, 
and in 2009 and 2010 to over $US 6 billion. (Note these figures are adjusted for 
inflation.)  
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Figure 1. Net official development assistance received by Afghanistan 
(constant 2010 US$) 
 
Source: World dataBank 
Afghanistan now receives much more aid than any other country in the world. Its level 
of aid is almost double (80% more than) the next biggest aid recipient which is the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Figure 2 compares aid to Afghanistan with aid to the 20 
largest recipients of aid. Apart from showing how Afghanistan stands by itself, this 
graph is also interesting in showing that of the other top 5 recipients of Australian aid 
only Vietnam and Indonesia appears on this graph, as the 7th and 20th largest recipient 
respectively. PNG is the 55th largest and Solomon Islands the 73rd.  
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Figure 2. Aid to the 20 largest aid recipients  
(2010, US$ billion) 
 
 
Source: World dataBank 
Not surprisingly, as the world’s largest aid recipient, Afghanistan is also one of the most 
aid dependent. Other smaller aid recipients are also much smaller in size, so 
Afghanistan is not actually the most dependent, but it is in the top five most aid 
dependent economies as Figure 3 below shows. It can be noted that for the average low-
income economy its volume of aid is about 10% of GNI.  
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Figure 3. Aid dependency (aid/GNI) of the 40 most aid-dependent largest aid 
recipients  
(2010, US$ billion) 
 
Source: World dataBank 
Note: The line for Liberia is truncated, and the actual ratio of aid/GNI for Liberia is given by the label on the 
top of the Liberia column. GNI is Gross National Income 
4. Summary of Australian aid to Afghanistan 
Australian aid to Afghanistan has increased rapidly over the last ten years, increasing 
from just a few million dollars in 2000-2001 to $200 million this year, and with a target 
of $250 million by 2015-2016 (Figure 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
L
ib
e
ri
a
S
o
lo
m
o
n
 I
s
la
n
d
s
M
a
rs
h
a
ll 
Is
la
n
d
s
H
a
iti
A
fg
h
a
n
is
ta
n
M
ic
ro
n
e
s
ia
, 
F
e
d
. 
S
ts
.
B
u
ru
n
d
i
C
o
n
g
o
, 
D
e
m
. 
R
e
p
.
T
u
v
a
lu
S
a
m
o
a
S
ie
rr
a
 L
e
o
n
e
S
a
o
 T
o
m
e
 a
n
d
 P
ri
n
c
ip
e
M
o
z
a
m
b
iq
u
e
M
a
la
w
i
C
a
p
e
 V
e
rd
e
P
a
la
u
T
o
n
g
a
R
w
a
n
d
a
G
u
in
e
a
-B
is
s
a
u
V
a
n
u
a
tu
C
o
n
g
o
, 
R
e
p
.
P
a
c
ifi
c
 is
la
n
d
 s
m
a
ll 
s
ta
te
s
N
ig
e
r
T
o
g
o
C
e
n
tr
a
l A
fr
ic
a
n
 R
e
p
u
b
lic
T
a
n
z
a
n
ia
C
o
m
o
ro
s
M
a
li
B
u
rk
in
a
 F
a
s
o
E
th
io
p
ia
G
a
m
b
ia
, 
T
h
e
K
o
s
o
v
o
M
a
u
ri
ta
n
ia
K
ir
ib
a
ti
B
e
n
in
U
g
a
n
d
a
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
%
  
 
8 
Figure 4. Australian aid to Afghanistan  
($Am, current prices) 
 
Source: Budget documents 
 
As a share of the total Australian aid program, aid to Afghanistan has increased  from 
0.4%  in 2000-01 to 3.9% in 2012-13. In the process, Afghanistan has become one of the 
most important aid programs for Australia. In 2012-13 Afghanistan was Australia’s 
fourth largest aid program, after Indonesia, PNG and Solomon Islands (Figure 5). By 
contrast even in 2005-6, Afghanistan was only Australia’s 16th largest country program.  
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Figure 5. Top 10 recipients of Australian aid  
($Am, 2012-13) 
 
Source: Budget documents 
 
Although Australian aid to Afghanistan is important for the Australian aid budget, 
Australia is a very small donor in the context of total international aid to Afghanistan. 
Between 2001 and 2010, Afghanistan received some $34 billion in international 
assistance. 40% of this was provided by the US. The second largest donor was the EU 
with 7%, followed by the UK and Japan with 6% and Germany and the International 
Development Association (the concessional arm of the World Bank) with 5%. Australia 
is the 15th largest donor over this period with just 1.4% of total assistance (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6. Share of 2001-2010 total aid to Afghanistan from the top twenty donors. 
 
 
Source: OECD DAC 
Australian aid has fluctuated around the 1.5% average, but the data shows no upward 
trend in the importance of Australian aid (Figure 7), since the scale up in Australian aid 
has largely matched the scale up in global aid. Australia’s importance has probably 
grown in recent years. International aid data is not available post-2010, but since then 
Australian aid to Afghanistan has increased significantly, and the Australian dollar has 
appreciated significantly against the US dollar making that aid more valuable.  
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Figure 7. Australia’s aid to Afghanistan as a share of total aid to Afghanistan, 
2001-2010 
 
Source: OECD DAC 
Whole of government aid, though declining in relative size, is still of great importance in 
Australian aid to Afghanistan (Figure 8).  The share of Australian aid delivered by 
AusAID was less than half in 2007-08 (and presumably much less than that in earlier 
years) but is now around 70%. Despite the growing importance of AusAID, the whole of 
government dimensions are still more important for Australia in Afghanistan than 
elsewhere. For example, in 2012-2013, the share of AusAID aid to total bilateral aid (i.e. 
AusAID and aid from other government departments) is on average 90%, much higher 
than the 70% for Afghanistan. 
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Figure 8. The proportion of Australian aid to Afghanistan delivered by AusAID, 
2007-2013  
 
Source: Senate Estimates; budget documents. 
About 80% of Australia’s aid program to Afghanistan is focused on national-level 
development. The other 20% is focused on Uruzgan, where the Australian Defence 
Force is based. This is partly through the Provincial Reconstruction Team and partly 
through AusAID. Australia also tries to steer some of its national funds to the benefit of 
Uruzgan. Compared to other donors, Australia appears to have a relatively high 
proportion of its aid directed to national programs. This is a strength of the program, 
since, as discussed later, the effectiveness of national aid is likely to be higher than that 
of aid to Uruzgan. 
Finally, it should be recognized that Australian aid to Afghanistan is only one part of the 
broader Australian effort in that country. This is brought out by Figure 9 which shows 
Australian aid spending as a proportion of combined aid and defence spending. Apart 
from 2003-04 and 2004-05, where Operation Slipper (under which Australia’s military 
operations in Afghanistan are deployed) was unfunded, the aid program has only been a 
small amount (10-20%) of the combined Australian military-aid effort in Afghanistan. 
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Figure 9. Australian aid spending as a proportion of combined aid and defence 
spending, 2001-2013  
 
Source: Budget documents. 
5. Strategy 
In December 2010, AusAID produced a document titled Australia’s strategic approach to 
aid in Afghanistan, which covered the period 2010-2012. While it is a step forward to 
have a country strategy, several comments need to be made on this strategy.  
First, it is ambiguous whether this is a strategy for the aid program as a whole or for 
that part of the aid program delivered by AusAID. On the one hand, the document begins 
by saying that it “lays out Australia’s strategic approach to the delivery of aid in 
Afghanistan.” However, the objective of the aid program is at one point said to be 
Australia’s objective (p.1) and at another point AusAID’s objective (p.12). In the latter 
case, the objective is described as AusAID’s objective “to support broader Australian 
Government efforts.” This sort of ambiguity is unfortunate. As is normally the case with 
country strategies, they should be for all aid, not just for AusAID. 
Recommendation 4 
That aid strategies for Afghanistan should be unambiguously for all Australian aid 
not just that provided by AusAID. 
Second, the objective itself is questionable. The objective (either for all aid or for aid 
from AusAID) is said to be “building the Afghan Government’s capacity to deliver services 
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and provide economic opportunities to its people.” This can be described as a capacity 
building objective. Capacity building in turn can be described as the holy grail of aid. 
Throughout the decades, aid programs around the world have sought to build capacity 
but with very mixed success. The key flaw with capacity building objectives and 
programs is  that they assume that the deficient capacity is the product of technical and 
financial weaknesses, and therefore that providing additional financing and technical 
inputs will help fill that capacity. Typically, however, capacities, if they need to be built, 
are deficient for other more political reasons. This is certainly the case in Afghanistan. 
Capacity is weak because the government is vulnerable and has limited legitimacy.  
Because of the deep-rooted domestic causes of limited capacity, the ability of aid to 
build capacity is severely limited. As Paul Collier has shown in his book The Bottom 
Billion on average it takes seventy years for a country to move out of “fragile state 
status”. Aid and security operations can, at best, help stabilize a country and provide a 
safety net, but they cannot put it on the path to prosperity.  This is a key lesson which 
Australia has learnt from interventions in the Solomon Islands and in Timor Leste, and 
it is one which applies even more strongly to Afghanistan. Australia has had very limited 
success in building capacity in these two neighbouring countries when it has been the 
major donor, and it is has been able (by and large) to win the peace. In Afghanistan, 
where Australia is a very minor donor, and where violence continues to be a major 
problem, a capacity building objective is completely unrealistic. 
Moreover, if the objective of Australian aid is actually to build government capacity then 
it has failed. Government capacity can be examined by a group of indices provided the 
World Bank Institute which measure different aspects of the quality and capacity of 
government. The most obvious measure of government capacity is government 
effectiveness, but other measures such as stability, control of corruption, rule of law, 
and voice & accountability are also important. Regulatory quality is relevant to the 
provision of economic opportunities. Figure 10 below shows the progress of 
Afghanistan in relation to these six indicators in terms of its percentile ranking among 
the 215 countries for which such data is available.  Unfortunately, for most of the last 
decade, Afghanistan has been bumping along the bottom of these governance indicators. 
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It showed a significant increase in government effectiveness and voice of accountability 
in the mid-2000s, but most of the gains made then have since  been lost. In relation to 
rule of low, control of corruption, and political stability/absence of violence Afghanistan 
is in the worst 2% of countries. In relation to regulatory quality, government 
effectiveness and voice/accountability Afghanistan is numbered among the worst 8% of 
countries. 
Figure 10. WBI governance indicators for Afghanistan, 1996 to 2011 
(percentile ranking, where 0=worst, 100=best; ranking out of 215 countries) 
 
Source: WBI Governance Indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
Finally, the capacity building objective is inconsistent with the nature of most of the 
Australian aid activities taking place. Most of these aid activities support the delivery of 
services. It would be better to describe the objective of the aid program as being to 
“assist the Afghan Government to deliver services and provide economic opportunities.” 
This would avoid the false implication that the aid program is helping build capacity in 
the government to deliver services even without aid.  
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Voice and Accountability Political Stability/Absence of Violence
Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
  
 
16 
Recommendation 5 
An objective of building government capacity is inappropriate and overly 
ambitious for the Australian aid program to Afghanistan. Moreover, if that is taken 
as the objective, Australian aid has clearly failed. A more realistic objective is one of 
helping the Afghanistan government deliver services and provide opportunities. 
Third and lastly, the diagnosis within the strategy document makes no reference to the 
illegal production of poppy except to say that it existed under the Taliban (p.5). But 
poppy production continues to be important for Afghanistan. According to ACFID, 
Afghanistan accounts for 90% of global heroin production. According to The Liason 
Office, quoting from the 2011 Afghan Opium Survey, in Uruzgan there was a 45% 
increase in opium poppy cultivation from 2010 to 2011 (from 7,337 ha to 10,620 ha).1 
In some districts in Uruzgan, 50-80% of the population is involved in opium poppy 
cultivation. Rural development is one of the Australian aid program’s pillars, but at no 
point does the strategy talk about poppy production.  This is very odd. 
Recommendation 6 
Especially given the explicit focus of the Australian aid strategy in Afghanistan on 
rural development, rather than avoiding the issue, Australia’s aid strategy should 
contain explicit analysis of the prevalence and trends in poppy production in 
Afghanistan and develop a position on whether one of the aims of our aid is to 
reduce poppy production and, if so, what strategies will be used. 
6. Development effectiveness 
This section examines the development effectiveness of Australia’s aid to Afghanistan. 
The next section examines the strategic effectiveness. 
                                                        
1 TLO 2012 Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover: A TLO provincial report, 
The Liaison Office, p. 32, available: 
http://www.tloafghanistan.org/images/PDF_Provincial_District_and_Area_Assessments/2012%20APRIL
%20TLO%20Uruzgan%20Report%20Mid%202010_%20End%202011.pdf  
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We are not in a position to make a definitive verdict of the effectiveness of Australian 
aid to Afghanistan. This would require much more research and information than is at 
our disposal. Overall, however, it is likely that the effectiveness of Australian aid to 
Afghanistan is low. This is for two reasons. 
First, as is well established, the primary determinant of aid effectiveness is the 
effectiveness of the government of the country that receives the aid. This is true 
whether or not that government actually receives the aid. Whether or not this is the 
case, more than anything else the recipient government establishes the enabling (or 
disabling) environment within which aid is disbursed. As long ago as 1985, an OECD 
Development Assistance Committee review concluded: “one of the compelling lessons of 
experience is that aid can only be as effective as the policy, economic and administrative 
environment in which it operates.” 2 The subsequent almost three decades of experience 
with aid have only confirmed this finding. Given this, and given the very weak 
performance and capacity of the Afghanistan government, not to mention the difficult 
security environment, it is highly likely that overall aid effectiveness in Afghanistan is 
low. 
Second, it is equally well-established that the problems which aid can cause at a 
country-wide level are more likely to arise when aid is provided in large volumes. Large 
amounts of aid relative to the size of the receiving economy can lead to problems such 
as Dutch Disease (appreciation of the real exchange rate), rent-seeking, and a high level 
of transactions costs associated with aid. While it is difficult to find evidence for this in 
any country, Afghanistan’s high level of aid dependency must give rise to the suspicion 
that whatever benefits aid to Afghanistan brings there are also serious costs. 
That said, there are some features of the Afghanistan program which are positive, which 
would benefit from the Committee’s scrutiny and which deserve consideration for 
                                                        
2 World Bank 2008 Aid Architecture, The World Bank, p.33, available: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Aid_Architecture-May2008.pdf  
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wider replication across the aid program. We highlight two. 
First, the Afghanistan aid program is unusual in the context of Australian aid in that it 
includes budget support, that is, aid from the Australian government to the Afghanistan 
government which is not earmarked to particular expenditures but available for general 
government expenditure. 
Australia has traditionally (at least after the experience in PNG in the 80s and 90s) been 
wary of providing budget support through aid. There has in recent times been an 
increase the share of Australian aid disbursed through partner government systems, but 
the latest figures, available for 2009-10, show that such aid still accounts for less than 
10% of all aid.3 And most of this aid would be, though disbursed through government 
systems, still earmarked to specific expenditures. There are very few if any other cases 
of the Australia providing budget support, certainly not on an annual basis as it is to 
Afghanistan. 
Not only does Australia provide budget support to Afghanistan, but it does so in large 
volumes.  The most recent figure we have available is for 2009-10 and for that year out 
of a total AusAID expenditure of $56 million $25 million was in budget support for the 
Afghanistan government. 
Australia provides budget support to the Afghanistan Government through the World 
Bank managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. About half is tied to government 
programs (such as in health, education, and the community-based National Solidarity 
Program) and about half is untied. By all accounts, both parts work well. The World 
Bank management provides useful coordination and oversight. We have been informed 
that AusAID has funded a review of the ARTF.  A summary of the outcomes of the report 
were expected to be announced and discussed at the 2012 Tokyo Conference, though, as 
far as we can ascertain, nothing has yet been released. The Committee’s investigation 
would benefit from access to the review’s preliminary findings. 
                                                        
3 This is shown in the 2011 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, Figure 2.8, p. 64, available: 
http://www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/aidreview.pdf  
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It is widely accepted that most of the corruption involving aid in Afghanistan has 
occurred with aid that went outside of government systems rather than aid which went 
through the ARTF. Aid projects directly implemented by donors often seem to involve 
deals with various middle-men and war-lords, and indeed one purpose of such aid may 
be to buy the support of such groups. Of course, the Afghanistan Government is itself 
highly corrupt, but the corruption does not seem to operate primarily through the 
largely recurrent and service delivery areas which the ARTF funds. This is not to say 
that none of the on-budget aid is wasted. Consider the aid which finances a teacher who 
does not turn up to school or who cannot read (having perhaps obtained their job by 
political connections). Or the aid which covers the costs of corrupt or violent police. 
Overall, however, the ARTF, which has been extensively and publicly reviewed (see 
here), seems to be an effective aid delivery mechanism. 
There are risks and downsides to the provision of budgetary support. But Afghanistan 
also suggests that there are strong benefits which could be applied to the Australian aid 
program in other countries. 
Recommendation 7 
The effectiveness of the largest component of the Australian aid spend in 
Afghanistan, the contributions to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, is 
likely to be comparatively high. Such regular use of budget support is extremely 
rare in the Australian aid program worldwide. Given the relative success in 
Afghanistan, budget support should be considered for more regular and 
widespread use in other aid recipient countries. 
The second positive feature of the Australian aid program in Afghanistan is its heavy 
reliance on non-government organizations. The figures we have seen suggest that 23% 
of the Afghanistan aid program goes through NGOs (9% to the International Red Cross, 
14% to Australian and national NGOs in 2009 according to ACFID). Some NGOs provide 
important humanitarian aid (Red Cross, MSF). For such NGOs, neutrality is critical. 
Other NGOs deliver services on behalf of the Afghanistan government. While we do not 
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have access to independent evaluations, overall it would seem (and is consistent with 
international evidence) that the NGOs do a good job in delivering health and education 
services. 
While more work would be needed to establish this with a high degree of confidence, it 
should also be asked why AusAID hasn’t made more use of NGOs to deliver services in 
other fragile settings, including PNG, where the opposite approach has been taken and 
AusAID has been determined to work with state providers to the neglect of NGOs and 
church-based providers. While recent reforms suggest this may be starting to change, 
the Afghanistan experience suggests that a lot more use could be made of NGOs to 
deliver services in fragile-state environments. 
Recommendation 8 
The heavy reliance on NGOs to deliver services in Afghanistan appears to have 
worked well. Though more evidence is required to establish this definitively, the 
Afghanistan experience should also be used to ask why the Australian aid program 
has not made more use of non-state actors in fragile-state settings. 
While these two positive features of the aid program are important ones, we are also 
obliged to mention one which appears to be negative, that is aid directly provided by 
Australian agencies – the ADF and AusAID – to Uruzgan. It is very hard to see aid to 
Uruzgan, other than perhaps humanitarian aid and support for NGOs for service 
delivery, as effective. We say this even though we have very little information on results 
on the ground simply because it is very hard to see Uruzgan as remaining under 
Afghanistan Government control post the Transition Period. In addition, the extreme 
insecurity in Uruzgan also challenges effectiveness. The delivery of aid by the ADF is 
also unlikely to be sustainable as it seems to be heavily focused on building 
infrastructure (roads that may not be maintained, schools that may lack teachers). 
There is also heavy use in Afghanistan of AusAID staff and experts hired through the 
Australian Civilian Corps as Development Advisers to “mentor line departments to 
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improve planning and service delivery.”4 These advisers have apparently helped 
Uruzgan officials develop a Provincial Development Plan. This sort of technical 
assistance is almost certainly a waste of money (and, more importantly, an unnecessary 
risk to human life) for three  reasons. First, the staff while no doubt capable and 
committed may or may not have the skills, experience and credibility to act as mentors, 
especially to sometimes much older officials, quite possibly with a background 
grounded in conflict and combat. Second, technical assistance has a very poor track 
record in weak-governance environments. For example, a 2005 evaluation of World 
Bank attempts at capacity building in Africa (2005) found: 
“The Bank’s traditional tools – technical assistance and training – have often 
proved ineffective in helping to build sustained public sector capacity.” 5 
Third, it is typical that such efforts (that is, the provision of technical assistance in a 
difficult governance environment) focus on planning documents, as is the case in 
Uruzgan. After all, plans are some things that can be conceived at a desk, and which 
result in an output (the published plan), and suggest progress. But in difficult 
environments, experience suggests that plans are typically irrelevant. What is needed 
instead is implementation. Typically, in weak governance environments, plans sit on the 
shelf, and play little or no useful role at all. 
Recommendation 9 
While more evidence is needed to obtain a definitive verdict, it is likely that the 
overall effectiveness of aid to Afghanistan is low given the country’s very poor 
governance, high levels of violence, and high degree of aid dependency. The 
effectiveness of ADF infrastructure and AusAID technical assistance provided to the 
Uruzgan Government is likely to be particularly low, especially given the likely 
                                                        
4 AusAID, Australia’s strategic approach to aid in Afghanistan 2010-2012, p. 11. 
5 World Bank 2005, Capacity Building in Africa: An OED Evaluation of World Bank Support, The World 
Bank, p. viii, available: 
http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/5676a297fe
57caf685256fdd00692e32/$FILE/africa_capacity_building.pdf  
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reversal of gains post-troop-withdrawal and should be discontinued or at least 
wound back.  
Finally, on the issue of development effectiveness, we point to a number of conclusions 
of the US Senate Foreign Relation Committee’s comprehensive 2011 staff report 
evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan.6 The report states:  
 
High staff turnover, pressure from the military, imbalances between military and 
civilian resources, unpredictable funding levels from Congress, and changing 
political timelines have further complicated efforts. Pressure to achieve rapid 
results puts our civilians under enormous strain to spend money quickly.” (p. 2-
3). 
Of particular note are the conclusions around turnover, traditionally a problem in 
AusAID and probably very high in Afghanistan, where rotations are kept short to 
manage stress. We suggest the Committee enquire further into whether high turnover is 
a problem for Australian aid as it is for US aid. 
The US report also notes: 
“Perhaps the single most important step the U.S. Government can take is to work 
with the Afghan Government and other donors to standardize Afghan salaries 
and work within Afghan Government staffing constraints. Donor practices of 
hiring Afghans at inflated salaries have drawn otherwise qualified civil servants 
away from the Afghan Government and created a culture of aid dependency.” (p. 
3). 
Again this would be a good topic for the Committee to enquire into. 
 
                                                        
6 US Senate 2011 Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, A majority staff report prepared for the 
use of the Committee on Foreign relations, available : 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SPRT%20112-21.pdf  
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Recommendation 10 
It would be useful for the Committee to enquire into whether the problems found by 
the US Senate enquiry, in particular relating to salaries and turnover, are also 
problems for Australian aid. 
7. Strategic effectiveness 
As noted at the start of this submission, it would be unrealistic, misleading and 
incomplete to assess the effectiveness of Australian aid only be reference to a 
development objective. Strategic objectives are also important. The AusAID strategy 
referred to earlier refers to the two broader objectives of Australian involvement in 
Afghanistan as being to prevent it becoming a safe haven for terrorism and to support 
Australia’s Alliance commitment to the United States. It notes that the role of aid is to 
promote not only the effectiveness but the legitimacy of the Afghan government (p. 11). 
This strategic objective for aid in contexts of counter-insurgency is often called winning 
hearts and minds. The essential aim of aid from this perspective is to undermine 
insurgency and build support for the existing, but threatened, government and/or its 
international allies. 
It is important to recognize that this is not a new objective. The literature on hearts and 
minds spans many decades and encompasses many different actors and environments 
from Malaya in the late 1940s to Afghanistan today.   
The concept of winning ‘hearts and minds’ is often attributed to the British 
administrator Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer7, who served during part of the 1948-60 
Malayan Emergency, and argued in 1952 that “the answer lies not in pouring more 
                                                        
7 Fitzsimmons, M 2008 ‘Hard Hearts and Open Minds? Governance, Identity and the Intellectual 
Foundations of Counterinsurgency Strategy,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 31, no. 3, p. 337. 
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troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people.” According to the U.S. 
Army’s Counterinsurgency manual, hearts and minds means: 
Hearts and minds consists of two separate components. ‘Hearts’ means 
persuading people that their best interests are served by counterinsurgency 
(COIN) success. ‘Minds’ means convincing them that the force can protect them 
and that resisting is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like 
soldiers and marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion is what counts.8 
The majority of the earlier literature on the strategic impact of aid (in Malaysia and 
Vietnam) has found mixed effectiveness in hearts and mind campaigns.9    
In the more recent episodes, there is again mixed support for the use of aid to achieve 
strategic objectives. Berman and Shapiro's study of hearts and minds policy in Iraq 
finds that the billions of dollars spent on reconstruction in Iraq did lead to a reduction 
in violence as measured by attacks recorded by Coalition and Iraqi security forces.10  
In Afghanistan empirical studies conducted thus far have found mixed results. The 
literature is limited to a few studies because of the difficulty of obtaining data, as well as 
the lack of dedicated monitoring and evaluation of programs. Few international 
agencies have designed projects with adequate pre, during and post-assessment 
mechanisms11 leading to a severe shortage of qualitative and quantitative information.  
One of the most comprehensive “hearts and minds” aid studies available for Afghanistan 
has been undertaken by The Feinstein Centre at Tufts University across five Afghan 
provinces: Balkh, Faryab, Helmand, Paktia and Uruzgan.   
                                                        
8 Department of the Army 2006 Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP, p. A-5. 
9 Nagl, JA, 2005. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
1st ed., Chicago: University Of Chicago Press. 
10 Berman, E, et al 2011 ‘Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq’, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 119, no. 4, p. 810. 
11 Wilton Park Conference 2010 Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan: Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Development Aid in COIN Operations, Report on Wilton Park Conference 1022, 11-14 March. West 
Sussex. 
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The study of Faryab12 province finds that perceptions of aid donors are “markedly 
negative”. Perceptions of government are negative also, with legitimacy being 
influenced by the negative reputation and capacities of the top layer of government 
rather than by aid projects.  
Perceptions of aid were found to be marginally more positive in the Feinstein Centre’s 
study of Balkh Province13. There was no consistent objection to international military 
forces undertaking development activities. Respondents in Balkh province felt they 
were penalised for being ‘peaceful’ and therefore did not receive as much aid as more 
insecure provinces. In contrast, a study of Helmand province (which is more insecure 
than Balkh) found perceptions of international aid and military delivery of aid to be 
consistently negative and corruption to be pervasive. The slow pace of reconstruction, 
poor project design, perceptions of corruption, and lack of local ownership undermined 
positive perceptions of aid.14 
In Uruzgan, research suggests that insecurity is largely a result of poor governance. 
Corruption, tribal politics and the heavy handedness of international forces have all 
negated any positive effects of aid. Aid was perceived to be poorly distributed and 
highly corrupt.15 To quote from the report: 
Similar to the four other provinces included in the study, respondents were highly 
critical of aid projects, mainly because aid was perceived to be both poorly distributed 
and highly corrupt, benefitting mainly the dominant powerholders. Uruzgan provided 
ample evidence of the destabilizing effects of aid projects. Given the characterization 
of aid projects as monopolized by people who were cruel and unjust, there was 
skepticism about the extent to which aid projects could contribute to security.” (p. 4). 
                                                        
12 Gompelman, G 2011 Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in 
Afghanistan’s Faryab Province, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. 
13 Fishstein, P 2010 Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in 
Balkh Province, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. 
14 Gordon, S 2011 Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in 
Afghanistan’s Helmand Province, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. 
15 Fishstein, P 2012 Winning Hearts and Minds in Uruzgan Province, Feinstein International Center, Tufts 
University. 
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The other major Afghanistan study, Beath et al., has more positive findings.16 This study 
used a randomised field experiment, where of the 500 villages sampled, half were 
randomly assigned to receive a community driven development program. The 
introduction of the National Solidarity Program – the largest aid program in the country 
– resulted in significant improvements in perceptions of economic wellbeing as well as 
people’s attitudes to all levels of government. The program also led to increased 
perceptions of security, even though it did not have any effect on the actual security 
environment. 
To summarise, it would appear that aid often (including in Uruzgan where Australian 
efforts are concentrated) fails to achieve its strategic objectives because the aid is itself 
tainted and ineffective. If aid is seen as going to people who are “cruel and unjust,” it will 
not succeed in changing attitudes. The Beath study confirms this finding by providing 
the opposite case: where the aid is seen as being fairly given and not in support of a very 
corrupt government (as seems to have been the case in the National Solidarity Program, 
at least in the villages surveyed) then aid will help win hearts and mind.  
Overall, the lesson appears to be that where aid is developmentally effective it will also 
be effective in achieving its strategic goals. The former is much easier said than done, 
and it is hardest in provinces where the governance is weakest and the insurgency 
strongest, such as Uruzgan. While the direct evidence is not conclusive, it appears highly 
unlikely that Australian aid has achieved its strategic objectives. 
8. Transparency, monitoring and evaluation 
Although the Australian aid program in general has become more transparent over time 
and monitoring and evaluation have improved over time, practice in regard to 
Afghanistan has lagged. A number of indicators support this finding: 
                                                        
16 Beath, A, Christia, F & Enikolopov, R, 2011. Winning Hearts and Minds Through Development: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. SSRN eLibrary. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1809677 
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 AusAID has released a number of evaluations from recent years.17 None of them 
relate to Afghanistan. 
 Most countries which receive significant volumes of Australian aid now have 
“transparency pages” on the AusAID website where key strategies and 
documents are provided: not Afghanistan. 
 Since 2006 AusAID has released an Annual Performance Report, in that year 
and/or one more recently for nearly every bilateral aid recipient. Afghanistan is 
one of the few exceptions, and the only one for a major aid program (certainly 
the only one in the top ten). The other exceptions (and their 2012-13 allocated 
budgets) are Iraq ($36.6m), Palestinian Territories & Other Middle East ($56m) 
and Latin America ($27.2m).  
 The Office of Development Effectiveness was established in 2006. It has 
conducted several country and sectoral evaluations, but never a country 
evaluation of Afghanistan or a sectoral evaluation which draws on Afghan 
experience. 
 John Eyers has undertaken a survey of evaluations of Australian aid to fragile and 
conflict-afflicted states, of which Afghanistan is clearly one.18 It is evident from 
his survey that Australian aid to Afghanistan has hardly been evaluated at all. As 
he also notes, there has been little evaluation of whole-of-government aid, that is, 
aid delivered by departments other than AusAID. As noted, this is a form of aid 
that is particularly prominent in Afghanistan.  
It is true, of course, that monitoring and evaluation is harder in Afghanistan than just 
about anywhere else in receipt of Australian aid. But this is all the more reason for 
emphasis to be given by the Australian government itself to monitoring and evaluation. 
                                                        
17 See the website http://ausaid.gov.au/publications/pages/2449_4722_245_1463_2026.aspx  
18 Eyers, J 2012 ‘Aid to Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: A Review of the Literature and Australia's 
Approach,’ Development Policy Centre Discussion Paper no. 21, available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103471  
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It should in particular be noted that the annual performance reports are reports by 
management. It is remarkable that AusAID has not thought it necessary to provide a 
report by management on its aid to Afghanistan even though there are so many 
questions around whether it represents value-for-money.  
Recommendation 11 
The same standards of transparency, monitoring and evaluation should apply to 
aid to Afghanistan as to aid to other countries, and to aid from other government 
departments as to aid from AusAID.  
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